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Abstract  
This paper seeks to investigate the ties between liberalism and imperialism. Although liberalism is not 
often associated with imperial tendencies, the social relationship between liberal and nonliberal peoples 
does not reflect the equality that is advocated by liberal theorists, but instead resembles an unequal power 
relationship. This relationship is indicative of imperialism which implies a clear delineation between the 
ruler and the ruled. How does this unequal power relationship between liberals and nonliberals go 
unnoticed? In an analysis of what I call the “rights-recognition" model of liberalism, I argue that the 
concept of “tolerance” is the key to understanding how this unequal relationship is maintained and made 
invisible. Specifically, I argue that liberals have misunderstood the concept of “tolerance” and, when 
properly understood, the concept implies the existence of an imperialistic power relationship. 
Furthermore, the way in which the concept of “tolerance” is understood and applied in liberal theory 
conceals that power relationship between liberals and nonliberals by masking it in a guise of universalism 
and inclusion. What I hope to show is the misconception of “tolerance” that is promoted in liberal theory 
can potentially lead to harmful consequences for nonliberal peoples. 
April 29, 2019 
Perhaps it is because of the liberal rhetoric of universality, tolerance, and equality, but liberalism 
has for hundreds of years now escaped the label of “imperialist”. Yet despite this rhetoric of 
universal freedom and equality, the social relations between liberals and nonliberals have 
frequently reflected the power relationship implied by imperialism. From the late-middle ages 
during the height of European empires, to American foreign policy today, there is a clear trend of 
imperial action among liberal states. To be clear, I understand imperialism as the practice of 
aggressive territorial or ideological expansionism. Territorial expansion refers to the unlawful 
occupation of foreign land; and ideological expansion refers to the unwanted imposition of an 
ideology upon foreign peoples. But more fundamentally, imperialism implies a clear delineation 
between ruler and ruled, and it is this unequal social relationship that I argue is present in the 
treatment of nonliberals by liberals. Imperialism, however, is by no means a feature of liberal 
theory, and so it raises the question, where does this power relationship come from? Why is it 
that the encounters between liberal and nonliberal peoples reflect the social dynamic implicated 
in imperial policies? My research investigates the following question: do liberals simply ignore 
their history of intolerance, or is there a reason that it goes unrecognized? In this paper I argue 
that inequality is embedded in the conceptual structure of liberalism itself and in the principles it 
embodies. This is what tacitly allows for the imperialistic power relationship between liberal and 
nonliberal peoples to appear as normal and amicable, rather than to be recognized for what it is. 
Specifically, my argument is that the concept of “tolerance”, widely promoted in liberal 
discourse by theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls, and William Connolly, is key to 
understanding the social relations between liberal and nonliberal states. For, the way in which 
the concept of “tolerance” is understood and applied in liberal theory conceals the inequality of 
the social relationship between liberals and nonliberals by masking it in a guise of universalism 
and inclusion. In what follows I undertake an analysis of the “rights-recognition” model of 
liberalism (hereafter RR) to explain how the concept of “tolerance”, properly understood, 
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presupposes a power relationship between “us” and “them” (i.e. liberal and nonliberal peoples) 
and maintains the status of nonliberals as the “other”. RR liberalism is a widely-espoused, 
contemporary variation of liberal theory which promotes secularism and human rights as a way 
for people to recognize one another as fundamentally equal, rights-holding individuals, rather 
than in terms of cultural or personal identities. This theory is based fundamentally on the liberal 
principle of “tolerance”, and therefore is suited to the research at hand. 
In this paper, I demonstrate that despite its claims to universalism, liberalism is, as an 
ideology, culturally-specific, rather than universal. Furthermore, the employment of tolerance in 
liberal theory is based on a crucial misconception of the term that sustains a false appearance 
of universality. The actual definition of tolerance, I argue, requires the presence of an “other” 
and, as such, implies the existence of a power relationship. For this reason, I make the case 
that the employment of the concept of “tolerance” allows for the imperialistic power relationship 
between liberals and nonliberals to seem normal, while also allowing it to continue. 
I begin by defining what I mean by “liberalism” in general and by the RR version of it that 
will be focus of this analysis in particular. I describe how liberalism, as an ideology, functions on 
the basis of what I refer to as its “principles” and the “ideas” through which they are expressed. 
In Section II, I demonstrate why RR liberalism should be seen as a culturally-specific ideology, 
despite its claims of universalism. My position is that the ideas which constitute RR liberalism 
developed out of the European tradition and remain biased towards that culture. Following that, 
Section III introduces the concept of “tolerance” and explains the contrast between the liberal 
conception of the term and the actual meaning of it based the definition of word. I argue here 
that the liberal concept of “tolerance” mistakenly associates it with the ability to produce equality, 
when, in fact, tolerance requires “others” and maintains their status as marginalized and 
separate from the dominant group. In the fourth and final section, I describe the implications of 
the power relationship that “tolerance” entails, when properly understood. Moreover, I show how 
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this power relationship goes unrecognized in liberal discourse, and the potentially harmful 
effects that it can cause. The outcome of this analysis is the conclusion that the imperial power 
relationship noticeable in liberal encounters with nonliberal peoples can be explained by the 
employment of the concept of “tolerance” in liberal theory; this concept both presupposes an 
unequal social relationship between liberals and “others”, and conceals that inequality behind 
the mask of liberalism’s supposedly universal principles. 
I. What is liberalism?
“Liberalism”, according to Duncan Bell, is a term that has been “employed in a dizzying variety 
of ways in political thought and social science” (2014, 682). Indeed, its “overuse and 
overextension have rendered [the term] so amorphous that it can now serve as an all-purpose 
word, whether of abuse or praise” (Shklar, 1989, 21). It is for this very reason that Gary Gerstle, 
in his essay on the nature of American liberalism, identified its “protean character” (1994, 1043). 
The ideas behind liberalism have morphed and evolved over the years, and so it is quite difficult 
to identify its essential core. In the broadest sense, there are two (related) ways of 
understanding it. The first, as articulated by James Fitzjames Stephen, sees liberalism as an 
ideology that counters tyranny: it is that which “wishes to alter existing institutions with the view 
of increasing popular power” (Stephen, 1862, 2). The second, closely related to the first, is that 
liberalism aims “to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal 
freedom” (Shklar, 1989, 21). 
However, as Jeremy Waldron points out, these conceptions are “too vague and abstract 
to be helpful” (Waldon, 1987, 131). They gloss over the evolution of liberalism and its 
constituent ideas. What liberalism means today is quite different from what it meant at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and what it meant in the early twentieth century is quite 
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different from what it meant during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For instance, 
more classical versions of liberal theory stress the negative nature of the freedom it claims to 
embody. This was noted by Leonard Hobhouse in the early twentieth century: liberal theory, it 
seems, urges us “not so much to build up as to pull down, to remove obstacles which block 
human progress, rather than to point the positive goal of endeavour or fashion the fabric of 
civilization. It finds humanity oppressed, and would set it free” (1911, 10). Contemporary 
liberals, on the other hand, tend more towards what Isaiah Berlin called “positive 
freedom” (Berlin, 2017). For example, contemporary liberal theory (based on the RR model 
described below) encourages the enactment of rights so as to empower us and give us the 
capacity to achieve whatever our personal goals may be. It is giving us something with which to 
achieve progress through our own means, rather than removing the external obstacles that 
block progress. 
It is precisely because of the elusiveness of the core of liberal theory that I endorse 
Gerstle’s conception of liberalism. Gerstle writes: “however much [liberalism] changed, it never 
abandoned three foundational principles: emancipation, rationality, and progress” (1994, 1046). 
He identifies what he calls the “foundational principles” of liberalism, to which I would add liberty, 
moral autonomy, individualism, and respect for others (which takes the form of ‘tolerance’ in 
many liberal theories) . This brings us to a new total of seven foundational principles which can 1
be said to characterize liberalism. In what follows, I pay specific attention to the foundational 
principle of “respect for others”, which often goes by the name of “tolerance” (and is how it will 
be referred to hereafter), because this concept is particularly problematic. Gerstle continues: 
“liberalism’s evolution can be understood as a series of efforts to reinterpret these principles in 
light of unexpected historical developments” (1994, p. 1046). In other words, according to 
 The four principles that I have added are inspired by a list of liberal principles drawn up by Michael Freeden (1996) 1
which include “liberty, individualism, progress, rationality, the general interest, sociability, [and] limited and responsible 
power”.
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Gerstle, liberalism is the ongoing interpretation and application of its foundational principles. As 
explained below, these interpretations are represented by various ideas. Gerstle thus 
acknowledges liberalism’s amorphous form while also identifying its fundamental pillars. This 
understanding reveals two components of liberal theory - its seven foundational principles and 
the various ideas through which they are interpreted.
Before the nineteenth century, for instance, the foundational principles of liberalism 
(emancipation, rationality, progress, liberty, moral autonomy, individualism, and tolerance) were 
represented in terms of such ideas as freedom from tyranny, a capitalist economy, and negative 
liberty. Today, on the other hand, the foundational principles are represented by ideas such as 
democracy, secularism, and human rights. In other words, we interpret individual principles 
differently based upon prevalent social values and conditions. As values change, so does the 
way the foundational principles are interpreted, and this produces a variety of forms of 
liberalism. In the simplest terms, the principles of liberalism are supposed to be the foundation 
of a free and equal society (however that is construed), and the vision of this society is 
expressed through the ideas that are currently valued. Ideas such as democracy, secularism, 
human rights, and positive liberty are the predominant ideas that represent the foundational 
principles of liberalism, and that reflect its meaning in contemporary liberal theory. They are 
ideas which have become increasingly popular over the past two centuries. 
Liberalism, today, is undoubtably the dominant ideology of the West. As Michael Freeden 
and Marc Stears put it: “liberalism possesses the unusual capacities of durability and 
adaptability”; “although liberalism has an identifiable core…its variants allow for an astonishing 
variety, and it has consequently provided both inspiration and opposition to a multitude of 
political programmes and movements” (2013, 329; 344). Its ubiquity is, in some ways, easy 
enough to understand. The liberal focus on the individual, rather than the collective, makes it 
very attractive. Liberals have taken age-old concepts such as freedom, justice, and equality 
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(among others), and they have refocused them on the individual subject. As such, liberals 
envision a society wherein, even without substantial wealth or land, one can have a reasonable 
degree of personal freedom and political representation. As Freeden and Stears say:
More than any other ideology, it has paved the way to the implementation of modern 
political practices in its methods of governing as well as in its slow but steady drive 
towards a social inclusiveness that embraces individual recognition and 
participation, as well as in its resolute commitment to safeguarding fundamental 
human well-being (2013, 329). 
Because liberalism is based on the principle of rationality and on the belief that all 
humans are capable of being rational, it follows for liberals that all individuals, regardless of 
background, are able to recognize the value of liberal principles. These claims of universality 
are recognized by non-liberals as much as they are by liberals, and while there is debate over 
whether or not they are valid, there is no question of their existence. George Crowder, for 
instance, recognizes that there is “inherent in liberalism a pressure toward more universal forms 
of justification” (Crowder, 1998, 8). Shklar, as well, sees in liberalism a “universal and especially 
a cosmopolitan claim” (Shklar, 1989, 29), while Wendy Brown decries “liberalism’s conceit about 
the universality of its principles” (Brown, 2009, 21). Whether or not one agrees that the 
principles of liberalism are actually universally valid, there is broad agreement that an effort to 
be universal is embedded in liberal claims. The supposed universality of liberalism means that 
its principles are applicable to all of humanity, and this implies that no one would disagree with 
them. A liberal society, under this understanding of universality, is based on principles which 
would disadvantage no one (liberal or nonliberal) and so the liberal society is thought to be open 
to anyone and everyone regardless of background or culture. In other words, If the society is 
one in which no could disagree with the basis upon which it is constituted, it suggests that no 
one would be opposed to, or disadvantaged by, living there.
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While different variations of liberal theory all, in some way or another, represent these 
foundational principles (rationality, progress, emancipation, liberty, moral autonomy, tolerance, 
and individualism), each one interprets them through different ideas. The particular version of 
liberalism that I address in this paper is ‘rights-recognition’ liberalism (RR), which has been 
popularized by the well-known philosophers Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. This 
contemporary form of liberalism is an ideal case to consider because it very clearly embodies 
the foundational principle of “tolerance”. As I have suggested, this concept is key to 
understanding how the imperial relationship between liberals and nonliberals has gone 
unnoticed. The problems that are apparent in the RR model thus provide valuable insight into 
the question of how imperial relationships, characterized by an unequal balance of power, are 
tacitly encouraged by liberals, even though liberals explicitly advocate equality.
The RR model of liberalism is established on the foundational principle of “tolerance”, 
but like all other liberal principles, “tolerance” is interpreted through various ideas. The two 
primary ideas which represent this principle in RR are human rights and secularism. A society 
based on the RR model of liberalism is one which recognizes other individuals as 
fundamentally-equal, rights-holding citizens whose collective action is based in a public space 
free from cultural and religious authority. As such, each member of the political community is 
recognized as a human, notwithstanding their memberships in various identity-based groups. 
The underlying claim is that individual members of the political community should be tolerated 
on the grounds that they have equal rights and are acting in a public sphere free from cultural 
and religious influence. Rawls expresses this idea as follows: 
I understand these ideas of justice to contain three main elements: (i) a list of certain 
basic rights and liberties and opportunities (familiar from constitutional democratic 
regimes); (ii) a high priority for these fundamental freedoms, especially with respect 
to claims of the general good and of perfectionist values; and (iii) measures assuring 
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all citizens adequate, all-purpose means to make effective use of their 
freedoms” (Rawls, 1993, 43).
Rawls can be seen to be advocating the rights-recognition version of liberalism here because he 
is saying that justice means the assurance of rights and freedoms for individuals and the mutual 
recognition of one another as fundamentally equal. 
Habermas, similarly, puts it in the following terms: “I think that liberalism does allow for 
an interpretation of equal rights that requires the state to grant the equal coexistence of majority 
and minority cultures; and that it should do so in terms of individual rights to cultural 
memberships of various sorts” (Habermas, 1995, p. 850). He says that liberal ideas allow for 
majority and minority cultures to coexist equally in society through the recognition of individual 
rights. To be clear, by individual rights Habermas is also referring to human rights since, in this 
context, both refer to human beings as individuals, rather than as members of a larger group. 
Habermas, then, also can be accurately described as an RR liberal in his advocation of 
individual rights as the means for achieving the liberal goals of freedom and equality.
The other fundamental component of rights-recognition liberalism is secularism. As I 
elaborate below, secularism provides the space for human rights to be recognized in place of 
religious or ethnic identities. By separating church and state, public space is freed from cultural 
authority and, instead, the rational justification of human rights becomes the basis of 
recognition. Secularism and human rights are the fundamental ideas through which the 
foundational principle of “tolerance” is interpreted within the RR model of liberalism. Together, 
they form the basis of that model.
Proponents of RR liberalism, like other liberals, claim their principles and ideas are 
universal. Both Rawls and Habermas, for example, have made these claims about their 
theories. Rawls says of the human rights associated with RR liberalism that they “are distinct…
they are of a special class of rights of universal application and hardly controversial in their 
 9
general intention” (Rawls, 1993, 59). Habermas, similarly, notes that “human rights are 
connected with a universalistic claim to validity” (Habermas, 2010, 475) as part of the 
“universalist project of the political Enlightenment” (Habermas, 2008, 21). Human rights claim to 
be universal even in name. The word ‘human’ suggests that these rights apply to all human 
beings, regardless of culture or background. Even if one would prefer to call them individual 
rights, the same connotation exists. The universal claims made by liberals are, in this case, built 
into the very concepts with which they are working. The society based on the RR model of 
liberalism, according to Rawls, has a constitution that “all citizens as free and equal may be 
reasonably expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common 
human reason” (Rawls, 2005, p. 137). But, as I argue in what follows, this conception 
misrepresents RR liberalism as universal, when it is actually culturally specific. This 
misrepresentation masks the inequality of nonliberals vis-a-vis liberals.
II. The Cultural Specificity of Liberal Principles
Culture, today, is identified “with the particular, local, and provincial” (Brown, 2009a, 21), 
whereas universalism is identified with the whole, global, and cosmopolitan. In the effort to 
proclaim their principles as universal, RR liberal theorists such as Rawls and Habermas go to 
great lengths to separate the principles of their theory from particular cultural values. 
Rhetorically, they have somewhat succeeded in this endeavour, as “the notion that liberalism, as 
a politics, is cultural, is catachrestic” (Brown, 2009a, 21). That is, the notion that liberalism is 
culturally specific is thought to be a paradox. In her essay “Tolerance as a Discourse of 
Depoliticization”, Brown outlines three broad ways that liberals have essayed to cement a 
separation between liberalism and culture. “There is, first, liberalism’s conceit about the 
universality of its basic principles: secularism, the rule of law, equal rights, moral autonomy, 
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individual liberty” (2009a, 21) . Second, there is “liberalism’s unit of analysis, the individual, and 2
its primary project, maximizing individual freedom, which stands antithetically to culture’s 
provision of coherence and continuity of groups—an antithesis that positions liberal principles 
and culture as mutual antagonists” (Brown, 2009a, 21). The third basis that Brown identifies is 
that liberalism,
presumes to master culture by privatizing and individualizing it, just as it privatizes 
and individualizes religion. It is the basic premise of liberal secularism and liberal 
universalism that neither culture nor religion are permitted to govern publicly; both 
are tolerated on the condition that they are privately and individually enjoyed 
(Brown, 2009a, 21). 
This is the most important point that Brown makes. Liberals are not simply trying to distinguish 
their ideology from culture, they are trying to master culture, to subordinate it to liberal 
principles. Culture becomes positioned as “necessarily antagonistic to [liberal] principles unless 
it is subordinated—that is, unless culture is literally ‘liberalized’ through privatization and 
individualization” (Brown, 2009a, 21). Culture is understood as an accessory of liberal 
universalism which has no governing power, it is a sort of optional extra.
In another essay describing how liberalism separates itself from and puts itself above 
culture, Brown explains how “liberal theory produces the figure of an individuated subject by 
abstracting and isolating deliberative rationality from embodied locations and cultural 
practices” (Brown, 2006, 300). Indeed, she says, “the formulation of rationality that has 
nonreason as its opposite presumes a Cartesian splitting of the mind from embodied, 
historicized, cultured being” (Brown, 2006, 300). The liberal subject as constitutively separate 
from culture implies an “optional relationship with culture, religion, and even ethnic belonging; it 
Although they are not identical, the principles identified by Brown correspond roughly to the seven principles listed in 2
Section I.
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sustains as well the conceit that the rationality of the subject is independent of these 
things” (Brown, 2006, 300). By positioning culture outside the liberal subject, “culture and 
religion, as forms of rule are dethroned, replaced by the self-rule of men” (Brown, 2006, 301). 
Broadly speaking, liberalism, insofar as it is portrayed as a master of culture, is universalized. To 
be a-cultural in this sense means that liberalism is not local nor particular, but rather what 
encompasses the whole.
On Brown’s view, however, liberal ideas are not universal, they are culturally-specific. In 
fact, liberal theory is teeming with cultural elements. As she says, “liberalism is not only itself a 
cultural form, it also is striated with nonliberal culture wherever it is institutionalized and 
practiced” (Brown, 2009, 23). In other words, not only is liberalism itself culturally specific, but its 
institutions and practices contain elements of other nonliberal cultures as well. Liberalism, like 
any other culture “involves a contingent, malleable, and protean set of beliefs and practices 
about being human and being together; about relating to self, others, and work; about doing and 
not doing; about valuing and not valuing select things” (Brown, 2009, 23). The specific nature of 
liberal culture becomes more apparent when one considers the origins of the two ideas which 
constitute RR liberalism, namely secularism and human rights. While the origin of RR liberalism 
is different from the origins of the ideas that constitute it, the fundamentality of these ideas to the 
ideology means that if they are culturally-specific, so too is RR liberalism.
Charles Taylor takes on the first aspect of this task in his article “Modes of 
Secularism” (1998). “Secularism”, Taylor says “is an invention of this [European] civilization and, 
by implication, does not travel well and should not be imposed on other cultures. For many 
Muslims…the attempt to apply its formulae in Muslim countries is perceived as an attempt to 
impose on them an alien form.” (1998, 31). The word “secular” he explains, derives from the 
latin word ‘saeculum’ which, according to Taylor, essentially denotes “a requirement of distance, 
or non-coincidence between the Church and the world”, of which the state was a part (1998, 
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32). Even though there was significant overlap between the Church and state, there was a still 
“a separation of spheres” (Taylor, 1998, 32). This term became particularly relevant during the 
“Wars of Religion” after the Reformation which marks the origin of “secularism" as a modern 
Western practice (Taylor, 1998, 32). The extreme violence and horror of these seemingly 
endless wars required some form of secularism (as we understand it today) as a ground for 
coexistence. Secularism, as a political practice, thus began as a solution to a specifically 
European problem, and it has been deemed to be inapplicable outside of the European context.
Elizabeth Shakman-Hurd elaborates on Taylor’s work by analyzing the effects of 
secularism today, specifically in International Relations discourse (although it is applicable in the 
broader context as well) (2004). Hurd identifies two different types of secularism that are 
prevalent now, laicism and the Judaeo-Christian model, and outlines how they both fall prey to 
the same problem of cultural specificity that Taylor highlights. The first type, laicism is “the belief 
in the need to privatize religion” (Hurd, 2004, 242). “The state upholds no religion, pursues no 
religious goals, and religiously-defined goods have no place in the catalogue of ends it 
promotes” (Hurd, 2004, 242). 
This type of secularism began with Kant and came to be understood as a sort of “rational 
religion” which sought to create “an authoritative public morality based on a singular conception 
of reason” (Kant, 1979; Hurd, 2006, 243). However, as William Connolly correctly points out 
(1999), this “rational religion” can “be thought of as a generic form of Christianity” (Hurd, 2004, 
242). Connolly shows how Kant essentially took the moral command system of Christianity and 
shifted its emphasis from the Christian God to the moral subject (1999). As Connolly explains, 
Kant’s “rational religion” shares several qualities with the ecclesiastical claims that it purportedly 
rejects: 
First, [Kant’s ‘rational religion’] places singular conceptions of reason and command 
morality above question. Second, it sets up (Kantian) philosophy as the highest 
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potential authority in adjudicating questions in these two domains and in guiding the 
people toward eventual enlightenment. Third, it defines the greatest danger to public 
morality as sectarianism within Christianity. Fourth, in the process of defrocking 
ecclesiastical theology and crowning philosophy as judge in the last instance, it also 
delegitimates a place for several non-Kantian, nontheistic perspectives in public life. 
(Connolly, 1999, 32)
Laicism, then, is not universal but derived from the Christian culture in Europe. Moreover, by 
claiming to expel religion from politics, “laicists set the terms for the delineation of what 
constitutes ‘religion’ [and] in doing so they implicit set the limits of public space” (Hurd, 2004, 
245). 
Because it is inherently Christian (and not universal), laicism is biased in favour of 
Western culture and against non-liberal cultures. This may explain why “laicism has indeed 
been hard to swallow for many Muslims” (Hurd, 2004, 245); “What to one side is a more strict 
and consistent application of the principles of neutrality is seen by the other side as 
partisanship” (Taylor, 1998, 36-7). As Taylor points out, laicism “does not travel well outside its 
heartland” (1998, 37)—that is, outside non-Western cultures. What Hurd is able to show very 
comprehensively is why that is, namely because the laicist version of secularism is inherently 
Christian in character.
It is the same story with the other form of secularism identified by Hurd, the Judaeo-
Christian model. Unlike laicism, the Judaeo-Christian version acknowledges a role for religion 
within politics. “In this variety of secularism…members of a political community agree upon an 
ethic of peaceful coexistence and political order based on doctrines common to all Christian 
sects, or even to all theists” (Hurd, 2004, 247). In the history of the West since the Reformation, 
the Judaeo-Christian model of secularism provided a relatively effective method for mediating 
between warring Christian sects. The problem, however, “is that this Judaeo-Christian secular 
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ground ends abruptly at the edge of Western civilization, however defined” (Hurd, 2004, 251). In 
other words, this model of secularism was not meant to be able to mediate conflicts involving 
non-Western belief systems in non-European states. 
From this point on, the fault lines between the West and the non-West realize 
themselves effortlessly. For once it is acknowledged that secularism is a unique 
Western achievement, it follows that those who are not secular are not Western, and 
those who are not Western cannot be secular (Hurd, 2004, 251).
Unlike laicism, which has a pretence of universality, the Judaeo-Christian model of secularism 
exhibits a strong sense of belonging to its nominal culture.
Secularism, then, which is one of the two ideas through which the liberal principle of 
“tolerance” is interpreted, is “still conceived within a broader Christian framework” (Hurd, 2004, 
241). Hurd demonstrates that secularism is not universal, but culturally-specific. She concludes 
that secularism “exhibits a tendency to close the political space” to non-Western systems of 
belief; “it occasionally acts as a faith intolerant of other faiths” (Hurd, 2004, 256). The two forms 
of secularism, as Hurd demonstrates, were born out of the European-Christian culture and 
remain today biased towards it. Since secularism is culturally-specific, it is difficult to maintain 
that the RR model of liberalism is universal because secularism is so fundamental to it.
The other fundamental feature of liberalism that is not universal in its nature is the idea 
of human rights. The concept of universal human rights, like secularism, emerged in Europe and 
continues today to be biased towards that cultural context. This development is traced 
comprehensively by Anthony Pagden in his article “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s 
Imperial Legacy” (2003). He begins by highlighting the long-held objection from non-Western 
states towards this concept. Even during the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the delegation from Saudi Arabia complained that the committee had “for the most part 
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taken into consideration only the standards recognized by Western civilization” at the expense 
of other, non-liberal cultures (quoted in Pagden, 2003, 171). As Pagden argues:
What all of these criticisms have in common is their clear recognition of—and 
objection to—the fact that “rights” are cultural artefacts masquerading as universal, 
immutable values. For whatever else they may be, rights are the creation of a 
specific legal tradition—that of ancient Rome, and in particular that of the great 
Roman jurists from the second to the sixth centuries, although both the concept and 
the culture from which it emerged were already well established by the early 
Republic. There is no autonomous conception of rights outside this culture. This may 
be obvious. But whereas those who are critical of the idea take it to be the self-
evident refutation of the possibility of any kind of universal or natural human 
entitlement, champions of rights, in particular of “human rights,” tend to pass over 
the history of the concept in silence (2003, 172).
Human rights, then, originate from the ancient roots of the European tradition and so are, like 
the two forms of secularism, culturally-specific. Pagden goes so far as to suggest that no other 
conception of rights exists outside of this culture. He traces the historical development of rights 
to determine “why we continue to believe that ‘our’ values are necessarily conterminous with 
those of the human race as a whole” (Pagden, 2003, 173). 
In Pagden’s account, the history of rights begins with the latin term “ius” which in Roman 
law referred more broadly to a legal claim to something. “Early Roman law lacked any notion of 
a right as we understand the word” (Pagden, 2003, 174). The Roman right was something one 
claimed under the law, not something that one had by virtue of being human. In the sixth 
century, this notion evolved into the concept of “natural law”. Initially introduced by the Emperor 
Justinian, it referred to “merely those patterns of behaviour—procreation, eating, and so on—
which are shared by all living beings” (Pagden, 2003, 174). However, the term was modified by 
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later jurists to refer to “forms of behaviour proper only to humans…and in the thirteenth century, 
Thomas Aquinas would transform it into a body of universal, and innate, principles which would 
act as a bridge between the human and the divine” (Pagden, 2003, 174). It was on the basis of 
these legal principles that the modern idea of “human rights” developed.
The connection between human rights and European culture is so pronounced that 
Pierre Manent referred to them as “the moral and political referent of the West” (2001). In fact, 
Pagden argues that rights can only ever be cultural artifacts. The idea of a a universal 
conception of rights is impossible:
For unless, as some modern theologians have insisted, we accept the idea of a 
transcendent deity who has simply given us our rights as our property in the same 
way that He or She has provided us with hands and the capacity for speech, the 
very notion of a translocal, transcultural human right only makes sense within the 
context of a conception of “humanity,” and since humanity is, empirically, and for 
whatever historical reason, social, then it can, in effect, only make sense in the 
context of a given understanding of what a society should be.” (Pagden, 2003, 192)3
In their attempt to prove the universality of liberalism, theorists of the RR ideology such 
as Rawls, and Habermas have tried to separate liberal principles from culturally-specific values. 
Liberal theorists postulate an “individuated subject” in an attempt to distinguish human reason 
from culture and to give humanity a mastery over culture as a sort of optional extra. Despite 
these attempts, the origins of secularism and human rights prevent RR liberalism from achieving 
universal applicability. As Taylor, Hurd, and Pagden all show, the two fundamental ideas of RR 
liberalism were born out of, and remain attached to, the European tradition. As such, RR 
liberalism, which relies so heavily on these two ideas, is not universal but culturally-specific. 
 Despite these arguments, Pagden nonetheless concludes that we should still promote human rights. Why he draws 3
this counter-intuitive conclusion is outside the scope of this paper.
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III. Tolerance
Despite the cultural specificity of RR liberalism, it has certainly accomplished an appearance of 
universality. This false appearance of universality, I argue, is caused by the foundational 
principle of “tolerance”. However, what exactly is “tolerance”? Before analyzing the implications 
of the concept (which is done in the next section), this section explores what “tolerance” actually 
means. The concept of “tolerance” is integral to liberalism. It is one of liberalism’s foundational 
principles and Brown describes it as “an emblem of Western civilization” (2009b, 37). Indeed, 
according to Will Kymlicka, “liberals are often defined as those who support toleration because it 
is necessary for the promotion of autonomy” (1998, 97). Moral autonomy is an integral part of 
the liberalism’s “individuated figure” and, as Bernard Williams says, “if toleration as a practice is 
to be defended in terms of its being a value, then it will have to appeal to substantive opinions 
about the good, in particular the good of individual autonomy” (1998, 24). Habermas as well 
alludes to the necessity of tolerance when he describes a liberal society as one that “that allows 
autonomous citizens to coexist in a civilized manner” (Habermas, 2008, 24). The term 
“coexistence” implies the presence of “differentness” and thus requires a concept to regulate 
difference. That concept is “tolerance”.
However, what exactly do we mean by tolerance? As Ahmet Insel asks, 
Tolerance is proposed as the central axis of a modern times policy to allow the 
coexistence of differences. But what coexistence? The one based on a general 
principle of equality of differences, particularly on the political and legal level, or the 
one based on an acceptance of the other from a commonly accepted hierarchy of 
differences? (Insel, 2019, 1-2).
 18
The former definition is a typical liberal understanding of tolerance, and the latter is a more of 
historical understanding (based, in Insel’s article, on the model of the Ottoman empire). The 
liberal conception, I argue is not a valid understanding of the term, whereas the historical 
understanding is closer to the actual definition of the concept. 
As a foundational principle of liberalism, the understanding of “tolerance” depends on 
how it is interpreted in the contemporary social context. In the RR model of liberalism, as I have 
shown, tolerance is interpreted through the ideas of secularism and human rights. In other 
words, tolerance, on this understanding, involves the presence and adoption of those two liberal 
ideas. Human rights and secularism, however, are culturally specific to the European, liberal 
tradition which means that “tolerance” is constituted by ideas that are exclusive to liberal 
peoples. To be tolerated in this sense, one must already be liberal (or at least willing to become 
liberal) since being tolerated (in the liberal sense) presupposes that one is liberal oneself, given 
that human rights and secularism are a prerequisite of being tolerated. As Brown puts it, the 
liberal conception of “tolerance thus requires in advance what it also promotes” (Brown, 2006, 
302). To put it another way, the liberal understanding of “tolerance” promotes liberal ideas, while 
simultaneously requiring their prior adoption. 
This understanding is more like a model of assimilation, then, rather than of tolerance, 
because it only applies to, and recognizes, liberals. To tolerate nonliberals, in this sense, is to 
impose liberal values upon them, and this is not to tolerate, but to assimilate. This can easily go 
unrecognized because of the perceived universality of liberalism (described earlier) because if 
liberal principles were truly applicable to all of humanity, there would be nothing to assimilate. 
Actual tolerance, however, which is based on the historical understanding outlined by Insel, 
requires the presence of the “other”, and as soon as the “other” disappears—whether because it 
has been accepted or rejected—tolerance is no longer relevant. As the proceeding definition will 
show, tolerance can only exist while there is an “other”. 
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A more accurate understanding of tolerance is provided by Brown—which corresponds 
with Insel’s historical version—who begins with the dictionary definition:
The Oxford English Dictionary identifies the Latin root of tolerance as tolerare 
meaning to bear, endure, or put up with and implying a certain moral disapproval. 
The OED offers three angles on tolerance as an ethical or political term: (1) ‘the 
action of practice of enduring pain or hardship’; (2) ‘the action of allowing; license, 
permission granted by an authority’; (3) ‘the disposition to be patient with or 
indulgent to the opinions or practices of others; freedom from bigotry…in judging the 
conduct of others; forbearance; ‘catholicity of spirit’ (2009b, 26, emphases hers; 
Oxford English Dictionary, 1971).
The actual meaning of tolerance, then, is radically different from the liberal conception of the 
term. “The OED definitions together make clear that tolerance involves neither neutrality 
towards nor respect for that which is being tolerated”, unlike the liberal understanding (Brown, 
2009b, 26). Tolerance, rather, is simply a protection against intolerance, nothing more. It does 
not require any further concession to be granted to the tolerated subject other than the 
acceptance of their existence. The three definitions offered by the dictionary—“enduring”, 
“licensing”, and “indulging”—imply the presence of something that one would prefer not to exist. 
To endure something, to license its presence, or to indulge its existence suggests that one is 
“suffering something one would rather not, but being positioned socially such that one can 
determine whether and how to suffer it, what one will allow from it” (Brown, 2009b, 26). The 
concept of “tolerance”, then, properly understood, is predicated on the presence of the “other” 
and is employed to regulate it. It is a conceptual tool of governance designed to be the mediator 
between “us” and “them”.
Based on this understanding, it becomes clear that the liberal concept of “tolerance” 
mistakenly associates it with the ability to produce equality. By masquerading a model of 
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assimilation as tolerance, liberals propound the benefits of assimilation under the name of 
tolerance. Whereas tolerance is incapable of producing equality, assimilation is, and so liberals 
have essentially found a way to promote the idea that tolerance is capable of producing equality 
(even though it is not). Furthermore, secularism and human rights are both liberal ideas that 
promote a liberal conception of equality. Human rights are attributed equally to everyone by 
virtue of their humanity, and the secular public space is said to be open to all kinds of people. By 
understanding the concept of “tolerance” as being constituted by these ideas based on equality, 
liberals imagine that tolerance can help create an equal society. The concept of “tolerance”, 
however, when properly understood, cannot produce equality. As the historical, actual definition 
of the concept shows, one can only practice tolerance with respect to a group which is set apart 
from the dominant, liberal group and is unequal in status. Properly understood, the concept of 
“tolerance” thus presupposes the existence of a power relationship and, as long as the act of 
tolerating remains relevant, so too does the power relationship (a point which will be returned to 
shortly).
The liberal concept of “tolerance” is based on the rhetoric associated with the term, 
rather than on its actual meaning. In particular, “tolerance” carries with it a language of 
multicultural inclusion. The employment of the concept during the religious wars after the 
Reformation associated it with a reputation for successful conflict resolution and multicultural 
accommodation. From its success in that context, it is easy to understand how “tolerance” 
became associated with ideas such as universalism, inclusivity, and openness in the West. As 
such, tolerance, today, is viewed as a concept which enables or even produces multiculturalism, 
openness, and equality. The concept of “tolerance”, however, is capable only of enabling 
multiculturalism, not producing it. It does allow for multiple faiths to live together in relative 
security, but it cannot produce inclusivity or equality. 
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No matter how ones theorizes about “tolerance”, the concept cannot be made into 
something it is not. Liberals such as Connolly, Insel, and Habermas have tried to align the 
meaning of tolerance with the value of inclusivity, but this is to misrepresent what “tolerance” is. 
In his essay “Pluralism and Faith”, for example, William Connolly makes this mistake (2006). 
Connolly recognizes some of the limitations of tolerance, namely that, as Leo Strauss argued, 
tolerance “pushed to the extreme…becomes perverted into the abandonment of all standards 
and hence all discipline” (Strauss, 1968, 63). Strauss’ concern was that an unlimited promotion 
of tolerance leads to intolerance, and so Connolly’s solution is to set limits on the concept in the 
context of what he calls ‘cultural pluralism’. A cultural pluralist “is one who prizes cultural 
diversity along several dimensions and is ready to join others in militant action, when necessary, 
to support pluralism against counter drives to unitarianism” (Connolly, 2006, 280). In other 
words, Connolly advocates a society where a plurality of faiths all live equally without one 
particular faith dominating, and he thinks that a limited form of tolerance can help to achieve this 
vision and protect against the threat of intolerance. “Pluralists set limits on tolerance to ensure 
that an exclusionary, unitarian movement does not take over an entire regime” (Connolly, 2006, 
281). By “limits”, Connolly is referring to measures which cut off the promotion of tolerance 
before it becomes intolerance. By doing so, Connolly hopes to avoid the concern raised Strauss 
that the concept of “tolerance”, in an extreme and unlimited form, can result in intolerance. The 
form of “tolerance” promoted by Connolly would be limited so as to not reach the extreme form 
that Strauss describes. 
The issue with Connolly’s conception of “tolerance”, however, is that he imagines that 
(even in a limited form) it can be part of an egalitarian society which “prizes cultural diversity” 
and “supports pluralism against counter drives to unitarianism” (Connolly, 2006, 280). Yet, as 
the definition of actual “tolerance” shows, as long as the concept is employed, an unequal 
“other” must be present. In other words, the concept of “tolerance” actually supports 
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unitarianism which places one group above the rest. While a limited form of tolerance may well 
protect against intolerance, it will not support Connolly’s idea of cultural pluralism in which 
diversity is celebrated and all different groups are on more or less equal footing. Setting limits 
on “tolerance” does not make the concept any more compatible with equality or an egalitarian 
society, it simply means that within the scope it is given, an unequal “other” will be present.
A similar, but unlimited conception of “tolerance” has been articulated by Habermas:
Tolerance means that believers of one faith, of a different faith and non-believers 
must mutually concede one another the right to those convictions, practices and 
ways of living that they themselves reject. This concession must be supported by a 
shared basis of mutual recognition from which repugnant dissonances can be 
overcome…Therefore, the basis of recognition is not the esteem for this or that 
characteristic or achievement, but the awareness of the fact that the other is a 
member of an inclusive community of citizens with equal rights, in which each 
individual is accountable to the others for his political contributions (Habermas, 
2008, 22).
The conception of “tolerance” advocated by Habermas entails the idea that tolerance itself can 
produce equality, which, as the definition of actual tolerance shows, is logically impossible. 
Unlike Connolly, who which imagines a limited form of tolerance as part of egalitarian society, 
Habermas takes it further by ignoring Strauss’ concern and imagining that “tolerance” 
represents the equality that he sees is part of a liberal society. Such an understanding of 
“tolerance” is clearly at odds with the definition of the term and misrepresents the concept as 
something it is not. 
Insel makes a similar error in his article. He suggests that there are two versions of 
tolerance, one based upon principles of equality, and another based on hierarchy. Historically 
the latter has been employed he says, and so moving forward “we must always be alert to the 
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assertion of majority tolerance if this posture is not supported by general principles of equality 
and policies to achieve them in practice” (2019, 5). Insel provides a very accurate analysis of 
the problems associated with the concept of “tolerance”, yet he maintains that (under the right 
circumstances) tolerance can be a part of an egalitarian society. As we have seen, however, of 
the two concepts of “tolerance” only one is logically supportable. That is the historical, actual 
conception of “tolerance” which, under no circumstances, is compatible with equality. Even if the 
concept of “tolerance” was supported or surrounded with principles of equality, it would not 
make the concept itself any more supportive or congruent with that equality. As long as 
“tolerance” is employed, the society in which it is being promoted will not be equal.
In short, the liberal conception of “tolerance” is a poor reflection of the concept when 
compared to the actual understanding of “tolerance” based on the definition of term. The liberal 
concept of “tolerance” mistakenly suggests that it is capable of producing equality when, in fact, 
the actual concept of “tolerance” requires the presence of an unequal “other”. 
IV. The Power Relationship of Tolerance
While the liberal concept of “tolerance” is associated with equality, inclusion, and openness, the 
actual understanding of the concept presupposes the existence of, and is predicated upon, a 
power relationship. The liberal presentation of term covers over the power relationship implied 
by “tolerance” through an appearance of universality that makes that relationship appear 
innocuous, but the concept is only relevant when there is a preexisting power relationship in 
place. Furthermore, covering over this power relationship has potentially harmful effects. As 
long as the concept of “tolerance” is employed, the “others” (nonliberals) cannot achieve equal 
footing with the dominant liberal group. The concept of “tolerance” requires the presence of 
“others” and they become placed in an awkward limbo wherein they are neither fully accepted 
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nor fully rejected—they occupy a sort of middle ground. When the the act of tolerating ceases 
(for whatever reason), it implies that the “other” has been removed from the middle ground and 
have now been either outright rejected (deemed intolerable) or assimilated (accepted as the 
same as the dominant group). For this reason, as long as the concept of “tolerance” remains a 
foundational principle of liberalism, social minorities will continue to be marginalized, while their 
relationship with the dominant group is made to appear amicable and equal. 
As explained in the previous section, the concept of  “tolerance” therefore does not 
produce equality; it produces a relatively functional multicultural society that is vulnerable to 
social discord because its minority groups can never achieve equal status. This concept should 
not be viewed as part of the egalitarian society imagined by liberals. Emerging as a solution to 
the incessant religious wars after the Reformation, tolerance was merely meant to provide a 
relatively functional multi-religious society, not an egalitarian utopia. As Brown remarks, 
“tolerance was initially embraced not as a moral or principled conviction but as a practical 
solution to an impossible impasse” (2009b, 32). In the context of the religious wars, the concept 
of “tolerance” was an ideal solution because it produced a certain level social stability. However, 
in the modern context where there already is a degree of social stability, tolerance simply covers 
over inequality. 
What emerges from this analysis is that the concept of “tolerance” is the prerogative of 
those who have power over those without it. The second OED definition (cited previously) 
highlights this specifically: “the action of allowing; license, permission granted by an 
authority” (OED, 1971). To tolerate is to presuppose that one is positioned socially in such a way 
as to be able to license the presence of another. For example, a state decides if it will tolerate 
the presence of a group of refugees or not. Kant made this observation concerning the relation 
between tolerance and power early in the history of liberalism: “a prince who does not find it 
beneath him to say that he takes it to be his duty to prescribe nothing, but rather to allow men 
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complete freedom in religious matters, [is one] who thereby renounces the arrogant title of 
tolerance” (Kant, 1996, 62). As Kant says, to tolerate is arrogant; it implies that the “other” is 
beneath me and that, out of sheer kindness, I will tolerate his or her presence. The concept of 
“tolerance” is thus a “posture of indulgence toward what one permits or licenses, a posture that 
softens or cloaks the power, authority, or normativity” of the act (Brown, 2009b, 26). “Tolerance” 
can be understood as a method for cloaking or softening the power relationship that is 
necessarily present. 
Indeed, as long as the concept of “tolerance” is in play, a power relationship is actually 
required. “Tolerance”, however, produces an appearance of universality that makes the power 
relationship invisible. It masks inequality in the language of universal inclusivity and openness 
with which it has become associated, while allowing for the unequal relationship to continue. To 
show how this works, Brown describes the image that becomes associated with liberalism as a 
result of the employment of “tolerance”. For Brown, liberalism’s appearance of universality is 
closely related “with the capacity for tolerance” and, moreover, “tolerance itself is identified with 
civilization” (2006, 310). Liberalism’s capacity for tolerance connects it with an appearance of 
universality that identifies it as above culture, rather than ruled by it. In other words “‘culture’ is 
what nonliberal peoples are imagined to be ruled and ordered by, but liberal peoples are 
considered to have culture or cultures” (2006, 299, emphasis hers). 
Nonliberal societies and practices, especially those designated as fundamentalist, 
are not only depicted as relentless and inherently intolerant but as potentially 
intolerable for their putative rule by culture or religion and concomitant devaluation 
of the autonomous individual, in short, their thwarting of individual autonomy with 
religious or cultural commandments” (2006, 310). 
The image of universalism associates liberalism with civility, rationality, and equality because 
liberals are deemed to be above the rule of culture, whereas non-universal regimes, by contrast, 
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become associated with the opposite qualities—intolerance, fundamentalism, and a dangerous 
disregard for individual rights. Universal liberalism, then, becomes “the broker of what is 
tolerable and intolerable” (Brown, 2006, 310-11). Imperial power relationships that start under 
the banner of universal liberalism disavow “the cultural imperialism that such aggression entails 
because the aggression is legitimated by the rule of law and the inviolability of rights and choice, 
each of which is designated in liberal discourse as universal and noncultural” (Brown, 2006, 
314). For Brown, then, liberalism is associated with universalism on the grounds of tolerance, 
civility, rationality, and equality, whereas nonliberal regimes are thought to be incapable of 
achieving these goods. As a result, liberalism is thought to be the sole ideology capable of 
providing equality among different groups because it is not governed by culture which is 
associated with particular locations or regions. The association with the capacity for tolerance 
and civility connects the liberal ideology to an image of universalism that covers over unequal 
power relationships.
Such associations as Brown describes can have potentially dangerous effects. To cover 
over a power relationship and treat it as unproblematic can lead to harmful consequences. 
Specifically, states acting under the liberal ideology can inadvertently legitimize aggression 
towards nonliberals. To reiterate Brown’s point, cultural imperialism under the liberal ideology is 
disregarded because “the aggression is legitimated by the rule of law and the inviolability of 
rights and choice, each of which is designated in liberal discourse as universal and 
noncultural” (Brown, 2006, 314). In his work, Pagden shows the potential effects of the power 
relationship that liberals fail to recognize between themselves and nonliberals. While he is not 
talking about the concept of “tolerance” explicitly, he is talking about the image of universality 
which, as Brown describes, becomes associated with liberalism as a result of the employment 
of tolerance. 
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Pagden demonstrates how the appearance of universality that is associated with RR 
liberalism can potentially justify aggression towards nonliberals in some extreme cases. To 
make this point, Pagden considers the issue of human rights. As shown earlier, human rights 
are products of European culture and descriptive of typically European subjects. The majority of 
nonliberal regimes are in contravention of these rights by the mere fact that they are nonliberal 
and this, as Pagden argues, seems to justify aggression towards them as a civilizing mission. 
Pagden’s work on the language of universal rights in liberal theory shows the potential effects of 
an unequal power relationship going unrecognized. 
Specifically, Pagden outlines three broad categories of rights which liberal empires have 
used to soften the impact of imperial power: “(1) the right to preemptive strike, (2) the right to the 
use of “vacant” lands, and (3) the right to punish those who transgress the law of 
nature” (Pagden, 2003, 181). The first right effectively justifies the conquests of liberal regimes 
in the name of defence. “If you are getting evidently stronger than me, I have a right to strike at 
you, before you are able to strike at me” (Pagden, 2003, 181). Rights (2) and (3) focus on the 
use of land, and they introduced something new to international relations: 
Both suppose that war may be made against both individuals and societies on the 
basis not of their behaviour towards potential belligerents but merely on the basis of 
the entirely non-belligerent customs they practice amongst themselves (Pagden, 
2003, 182). 
Under the guise of universality, the liberals that Pagden describes claim to know what is good 
for the world, and this is presumed to give them the right to invade the land of those who appear 
to be conducting their society incorrectly. Rights (2) and (3) were closely related in practice, 
moreover, since the cultivation of soil “not only deserves the attention of a government because 
of its great utility, but in addition is an obligation imposed upon man by nature. Every nation is 
therefore bound by natural law to cultivate the land which has fallen to its share” (Quoted in 
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Pagden, 2003, 183, emphasis his). Barbarians who left land unoccupied, then, were thought to 
be in violation of the law of nature, and so liberal regimes were presumed to have the right to 
seize that land without opposition. Natural rights became a way for liberals to justify any desired 
conquest on the ground that, because they were universal, they had the power to determine 
what was good and right for humankind and what needed to be fixed. In other words, because 
the unequal relationship between liberals and nonliberals was being covered over, the law of 
nature, in effect, became a way to justify expansionism in the name of civilization. As Pagden 
puts it:
Since the law of nature had no obvious limits, any deviation from the more central 
normative rules by which civilised beings lived their lives could be construed not 
simply as different but as unnatural. Simply, the arguments came down to the claim 
that those who do not have cultures which perform as we assume cultures should 
perform can be dispossessed by those who do (Pagden, 2003, 183). 
Pagden shows that the appearance of universality can potentially justify aggression towards 
nonliberals by framing as a civilizing mission, as if they are bringing development to the 
barbarians. 
In another article, Pagden provides an in depth description of the Spanish conquest of 
the Americas, which exemplifies his argument (1987). The article investigates how the Spanish 
justified their invasion of the Americas: the majority of the arguments in favour of the conquest 
emphasized their need to civilize the indigenous barbarians. Pagden addresses the work of 
Francisco de Vittoria in particular, a theologian of the time, who sought to understand how the 
Spanish Crown could justify the conquest on the basis on natural rights. The Spanish had 
argued that the Americans had violated their natural rights and, as such, the Europeans had a 
good reason to invade their territory and help bring civilization to this new region (Pagden, 
1987). This example demonstrates very clearly the variety of ways that the Spanish, in belief of 
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their own universality, could cover over a dramatically unequal relationship by emphasizing the 
helpful nature of their colonial efforts. These rights cover over the inequality between liberals 
and nonliberals by justifying aggression as a legal prerogative founded on the rule of law, when 
it is arguably the exploitation of supposed inferiors.
Brown and Pagden each show in a different way how liberalism’s appearance of 
universality masks the imperialistic power relationship between liberals and nonliberals. Brown, 
on the one hand, observes that by achieving the appearance of universality, liberalism becomes 
associated with civility and equality, while nonliberal regimes are seen as intolerable, 
fundamentalist, and unequal. Pagden, on the other hand, shows us the potential effects of the 
unrecognized power relationship by describing how liberals can use the language of universal 
rights to legitimize conquest against nonliberals on the basis of natural law.
V. Conclusion
Tolerance, when promoted by contemporary RR liberals, prevents the realization of equality 
while continuing to cover over the power relationship between liberals and nonliberals. In this 
paper, I have argued that the RR model of liberalism, in spite of its rhetoric, is not universal, but 
rather culturally-specific. The RR model of liberalism is founded on the liberal principle of 
“tolerance” which is interpreted (in this model) through the ideas of human rights and 
secularism. I have demonstrated that both of these ideas originated and developed in the 
European tradition, and therefore are specific to that cultural region. In spite of its cultural 
specificity, however, RR liberalism has maintained an illusion of universality that is sustained by 
the liberal concept of “tolerance” which mistakenly associates the term with the ability to 
produce equality among different groups. I show how, when properly understood, the concept of 
“tolerance” cannot produce equality because it requires the presence of an unequal “other”. 
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Furthermore, the actual meaning of “tolerance” entails a power relationship that is covered over 
and normalized by the ideas which have become associated with that concept and, by 
extension, with RR liberal theory more generally. Covering over this power relationship, 
however, has potentially harsh effects on nonliberal peoples as was demonstrated through the 
work of Pagden. Overall, I hope to have shown that the concept of “tolerance” is the key 
element in RR liberal theory that explains how the power relationship between liberals and 
nonliberals is maintained and continues to go unrecognized. 
In order to achieve the liberal goals of freedom and equality, the mask of equality 
provided by the concept of “tolerance” must be pulled off. For a long time now, the imperialistic 
power relationship between liberals and nonliberals has gone unnoticed in liberal discourse and 
it is a misunderstanding of the concept of “tolerance”, I have argued, which has allowed the 
inequality between liberals and nonliberals to persist. Perhaps with a better understanding of the 
concept of “tolerance”, liberals can begin understand the limitations of their ideology and 
recognize the reality of the relationship between liberal and nonliberal peoples. 
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